

**- DECISION -**

Claimant:  
ADETOLA A ADEOSUN

Decision No.: 1130-BR-12

Date: March 05, 2012

Appeal No.: 1142546

S.S. No.:

Employer:  
HILL PEDIATRIC DENTISTRY AND

L.O. No.: 64

Appellant: Claimant

Issue: Whether the claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1001.

---

**- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -**

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200.

The period for filing an appeal expires: April 04, 2012

---

**REVIEW OF THE RECORD**

After a review of the record, and after deleting the last sentence of the first paragraph, the Board adopts the hearing examiner's modified findings of fact. However, the Board concludes that these facts warrant and different conclusions of law and reverses the hearing examiner's decision.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., §8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification

provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training*, 309 Md. 28 (1987).

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., §8-510(d); COMAR 09.32.06.04*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1)*.

A threshold issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the claimant was discharged. For the following reasons, the Board reverses the hearing examiner's decision on this issue.

The burden of proof in this case is allocated according to whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the employer discharged the claimant. In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc.*, 164-BH-83; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc.*, 30-BR-85; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation*, 869-BH-87; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction*, 347-BH-89; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co.*, 441-BH-89.

When a claimant voluntarily leaves work, he has the burden of proving that he left for good cause or valid circumstances based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hargrove v. City of Baltimore*, 2033-BH-83; *Chisholm v. Johns Hopkins Hospital*, 66-BR-89. Purely personal reasons, no matter how compelling, cannot constitute good cause as a matter of law. *Bd. Of Educ. Of Montgomery County v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985). An objective standard is used to determine if the average employee would have left work in that situation; in addition, a determination is made as to whether a particular employee left in good faith, and an element of good faith is whether the claimant has exhausted all reasonable alternatives before leaving work. *Board of Educ. v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985); also see *Bohrer v. Sheetz, Inc.*, Law No. 13361, (Cir. Ct. for Washington Co., Apr. 24, 1984). The "necessitous or compelling" requirement relating to a cause for leaving work voluntarily does not apply to "good cause". *Board of Educ. v. Paynter*, 303 Md. 22 (1985).

The intent to discharge or the intent to voluntarily quit can be manifested by words or actions. "Due to leaving work voluntarily" has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity. It expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally and of his or her own free will, terminated the employment. *Allen v. Core Target Youth Program*, 275 Md. 69 (1975). A claimant's intent or state of mind is a factual issue for the Board of Appeals to resolve. *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Taylor*, 108 Md. 250(1996), *aff'd sub. nom.*, 344 Md. 687 (1997). An intent to quit one's job can be manifested by actions as well as words. *Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company*, 1101-BH-82. A resignation submitted in response to charges which *might* lead to discharge is a voluntary quit. *Hickman v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.*, 973-BR-88.

The intent to discharge can be manifested by actions as well as words. The issue is whether the reasonable person in the position of the claimant believed in good faith that he was discharged. *See Dei Svaldi v. Martin Taubenfeld, D.D.S., P.A., 1074-BR-88* (the claimant was discharged after a telephone conversation during which she stated her anger at the employer and the employer stated to her, "If that's the way you feel, then you might as well not come in anymore." The claimant's reply of "Fine" does not make it a quit). *Compare, Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company, 1101-BH-82*. A quit in lieu of discharge is a discharge for unemployment insurance purposes. *Tressler v. Anchor Motor Freight, 105-BR-83*.

In her appeal, the claimant reiterates her contention that she did not quit this employment. The Board agrees. The claimant was discharged by the Office Manager, over the telephone. The hearing examiner found that the claimant should have called the doctor to whom the Office Manager reported for confirmation of this. The Board does not see why the claimant should have been expected to verify her termination. The Office Manager was not just some random co-worker who was reporting a rumor or speculation to the claimant. The Office Manager was in a position of authority within the employer's structure and had spoken to the doctor. The claimant should not be expected to call anyone higher in authority under these circumstances. The Board finds the claimant was discharged.

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83; Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85; Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87; Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89; Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89*.

As the Court of Appeals explained in *Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 82, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998)*, "in enacting the unemployment compensation program, the legislature created a graduated, three-tiered system of disqualifications from benefits based on employee misconduct. The severity of the disqualification increases in proportion to the seriousness of the misconduct."

*Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Boardley, 164 Md. 404, 408 fn.1 (2005)*.

Section 8-1002 of the Labor and Employment Article defines gross misconduct as conduct of an employee that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that an employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit or repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

The term "misconduct" as used in the statute means a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment or on the employer's premises, within the meaning of Section 8-1003 of the Labor and Employment Article. (*See, Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113*).

Simple misconduct within the meaning of § 8-1003 does not require intentional misbehavior. *DLLR v. Hider*, 349 Md. 71 (1998). Misconduct must be connected with the work; the mere fact that misconduct adversely affects the employer's interests is not enough. *Fino v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd.*, 218 Md. 504 (1959). Although not sufficient in itself, a breach of duty to an employer is an essential element to make an act connected with the work. *Empl. Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202 (1958). Misconduct, however, need not occur during the hours of employment or the employer's premises. *Id.*

Without sufficient evidence of a willful and wanton disregard of an employee's obligations or gross indifference to the employer's interests, there can be no finding of gross misconduct. *Lehman v. Baker Protective Services, Inc.*, 221-BR-89. Where a showing of gross misconduct is based on a single action, the employer must show the employee demonstrated gross indifference to the employer's interests. *DLLR v. Muddiman*, 120 Md. App. 725, 737 (1998).

In determining whether an employee has committed gross misconduct, "[t]he important element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the employer's rights." *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Jones*, 79 Md. App. 531, 536 (1989). "It is also proper to note that what is 'deliberate and willful misconduct' will vary with each particular case. Here we 'are not looking simply for substandard conduct...but for a willful or wanton state of mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct.'" *Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202, 207 (1958)(internal citation omitted); also see *Hernandez v. DLLR*, 122 Md. App. 19, 25 (1998).

On appeal, the Board reviews the evidence of record from the Lower Appeals Division hearing. Here, the employer did not appear at the hearing. The employer did not present any evidence of the reason for the claimant's termination from employment. There is nothing in the record upon which a finding of misconduct or gross misconduct may be based.


The Board notes that the hearing examiner did not offer or admit the *Agency Fact Finding Report* into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.


The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the employer has not met its burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rose to the level of gross misconduct within the meaning of § 8-1002. The employer has also not met its burden of showing that the claimant's discharge was for misconduct within the meaning of § 8-1003. The decision shall be reversed for the reasons stated herein.

### DECISION

It is held that the claimant was discharged, but not for gross misconduct or misconduct connected with the work, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1002 or 1003. No disqualification is imposed based upon the claimant's separation from employment with HILL PEDIATRIC AND DENTISTRY.

The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Clayton A. Mitchell, Sr., Associate Member

RD

Copies mailed to:

ADETOLA A. ADEOSUN  
HILL PEDIATRIC DENTISTRY AND  
Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary

**UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS DECISION**

ADETOLA A ADEOSUN

SSN #

**Claimant**

vs.

HILL PEDIATRIC DENTISTRY AND

**Employer/Agency**

Before the:

**Maryland Department of Labor,  
Licensing and Regulation**

**Division of Appeals**

1100 North Eutaw Street

Room 511

Baltimore, MD 21201

(410) 767-2421

Appeal Number: 1142546

Appellant: Claimant

Local Office : 64 / BALTOMETRO  
CALL CENTER

December 19, 2011

**For the Claimant: PRESENT**

**For the Employer:**

**For the Agency:**

**ISSUE(S)**

Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the MD. Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 1001 (Voluntary Quit for good cause), 1002 - 1002.1 (Gross/Aggravated Misconduct connected with the work), or 1003 (Misconduct connected with the work).

**FINDINGS OF FACT**

The claimant, Adetola Adeosun, was employed with Hill Pediatric Dentistry from February 2, 2010 to July 28, 2010. At the time of separation, she was working full time as a dental assistant, earning \$15.00 per hour. The claimant voluntarily quit the job.

The claimant's mother was very ill and the claimant wanted to take off one day of work. She called the office manager, Gabriel, before her shift, to report her absence. She spoke directly to Gabriel. Gabriel approved the absence. Later that evening, Gabriel called the claimant and told her that Dr. Hill, the employer, did not want the claimant to come to work anymore. The claimant had not been absent previously

and had no written or verbal warnings. The claimant did not contact Dr. Hill to verify what Gabriel said. Dr. Hill had previously given the claimant her cell phone number. As a result of Gabriel's statement, the claimant stopped reporting to work.

### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits when unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily. The Court of Appeals interpreted Section 8-1001 in Allen v. CORE Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975): "As we see it, the phrase 'leaving work voluntarily' has a plain, definite and sensible meaning...; it expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally, of his or her own free will, terminated the employment." 275 Md. at 79.

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits where unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer, or without valid circumstances. A circumstance is valid only if it is (i) a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit; or (ii) of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has no reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.

### EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

The Hearing Examiner considered all of the testimony and evidence of record in reaching this decision. Where the evidence was in conflict, the Hearing Examiner decided the Facts on the credible evidence as determined by the Hearing Examiner.

The claimant had the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she voluntarily quit her position for reasons that constitute either good cause or valid circumstances pursuant to the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. Hargrove v. City of Baltimore, 2033-BH-83. In this case, the claimant failed to meet this burden.

The credible evidence established that the claimant stopped reporting to work after an office manager told the claimant that the employer did not want the claimant to come to work anymore. The claimant, who had a good attendance record and no previous warnings, never contacted the employer to verify this message.

### DECISION

IT IS HELD THAT the claimant's unemployment was due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause or valid circumstances within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001. Benefits are denied for the week beginning July 18, 10 and until the claimant becomes reemployed and earns at least 15 times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in covered wages and thereafter becomes unemployed through no fault of the claimant.

The determination of the Claims Specialist is modified.



R M Tabackman, Esq.  
Hearing Examiner

### **Notice of Right to Request Waiver of Overpayment**

The Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation may seek recovery of any overpayment received by the Claimant. Pursuant to Section 8-809 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and Code of Maryland Regulations 09.32.07.01 through 09.32.07.09, the Claimant has a right to request a waiver of recovery of this overpayment. This request may be made by contacting Overpayment Recoveries Unit at 410-767-2404. If this request is made, the Claimant is entitled to a hearing on this issue.

**A request for waiver of recovery of overpayment does not act as an appeal of this decision.**

**Esto es un documento legal importante que decide si usted recibirá los beneficios del seguro del desempleo. Si usted disiente de lo que fue decidido, usted tiene un tiempo limitado a apelar esta decisión. Si usted no entiende cómo apelar, usted puede contactar (301) 313-8000 para una explicación.**

### **Notice of Right of Further Appeal**

Any party may request a further appeal either in person, by facsimile or by mail with the Board of Appeals. Under COMAR 09.32.06.01A(1) appeals may not be filed by e-mail. Your appeal must be filed by January 03, 2012. You may file your request for further appeal in person at or by mail to the following address:

Board of Appeals  
1100 North Eutaw Street  
Room 515  
Baltimore, Maryland 21201  
Fax 410-767-2787  
Phone 410-767-2781

**NOTE:** Appeals filed by mail are considered timely on the date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark.



Date of hearing: December 13, 2011

DAH/Specialist ID: RWD3A

Seq No: 003

Copies mailed on December 19, 2011 to:

ADETOLA A. ADEOSUN

HILL PEDIATRIC DENTISTRY AND

LOCAL OFFICE #64