

- DECISION -

Claimant:

TONICHEA C WAYNES

Decision No.: 1883-BR-13

Date: May 8, 2013

Appeal No.: 1304244

S.S. No.:

Employer:

PRINCE GEORGES CTY GOV EMPLOY

L.O. No.: 63

Appellant: Claimant

Issue: Whether the claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1001.

- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the *Maryland Rules of Procedure, Title 7, Chapter 200*.

The period for filing an appeal expires: June 7, 2013

REVIEW OF THE RECORD

After a review of the record, the Board adopts the hearing examiner's findings of fact. The Board makes the following additional findings of fact:

After the claimant's injury and medical treatment she was not able to stand for prolonged periods. Standing is a necessary function of a correctional officer's job. The claimant kept the employer apprised of her condition. No other positions were available for the claimant which she could have performed as sedentary work on a long-term basis. When the claimant could no longer perform the functions of her position, and no other work was available, the employer separated the claimant from employment.

The Board concludes that these facts warrant different conclusions of law and a reversal of the hearing examiner's decision.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., §8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training, 309 Md. 28 (1987)*.

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., §8-510(d); COMAR 09.32.06.04*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.03(E)(1)*.

The threshold issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the claimant was discharged.

The intent to voluntarily quit can be manifested by words or actions. "Due to leaving work voluntarily" has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity. It expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally and of his or her own free will, terminated the employment. *Allen v. Core Target Youth Program, 275 Md. 69 (1975)*. A claimant's intent or state of mind is a factual issue for the Board of Appeals to resolve. *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Taylor, 108 Md. 250(1996), aff'd sub. nom., 344 Md. 687 (1997)*. An intent to quit one's job can be manifested by actions as well as words. *Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company, 1101-BH-82*. A resignation submitted in response to charges which *might* lead to discharge is a voluntary quit. *Hickman v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 973-BR-88*.

The intent to discharge can be manifested by actions as well as words. The issue is whether the reasonable person in the position of the claimant believed in good faith that he was discharged. *See Dei Svaldi v. Martin Taubenfeld, D.D.S., P.A., 1074-BR-88* (the claimant was discharged after a telephone conversation during which she stated her anger at the employer and the employer stated to her, "If that's the way you feel, then you might as well not come in anymore." The claimant's reply of "Fine" does not make it a quit). *Compare, Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company, 1101-BH-82*. A quit in lieu of discharge is a discharge for unemployment insurance purposes. *Tressler v. Anchor Motor Freight, 105-BR-83*.

The Board reverses the hearing examiner on this issue. The claimant never formed the intent to quit her employment. The claimant wanted to remain and attempted to do so. The employer was not able to accommodate her medical restrictions and had no other position to which the claimant could transfer. As a result, the employer initiated the separation, making this a discharge.

The burden of proof in this case is allocated according to whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the employer discharged the claimant. In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc.*, 164-BH-83; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc.*, 30-BR-85; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation*, 869-BH-87; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction*, 347-BH-89; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co.*, 441-BH-89.

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc.*, 164-BH-83; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc.*, 30-BR-85; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation*, 869-BH-87; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction*, 347-BH-89; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co.*, 441-BH-89.

As the Court of Appeals explained in *Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Hider*, 349 Md. 71, 82, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998), "in enacting the unemployment compensation program, the legislature created a graduated, three-tiered system of disqualifications from benefits based on employee misconduct. The severity of the disqualification increases in proportion to the seriousness of the misconduct."

Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Boardley, 164 Md. 404, 408 fn.1 (2005).

Section 8-1002 of the Labor and Employment Article defines gross misconduct as conduct of an employee that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that an employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit or repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

The term "misconduct" as used in the statute means a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment or on the employer's premises, within the meaning of Section 8-1003 of the Labor and Employment Article. (See, *Rogers v. Radio Shack*, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113).

Simple misconduct within the meaning of §8-1003 does not require intentional misbehavior. *DLLR v. Hider*, 349 Md. 71 (1998); also see *Johns Hopkins University v. Board of Labor, Licensing and Regulation*, 134 Md. App. 653, 662-63 (2000)(psychiatric condition which prevented claimant from conforming his/her conduct to accepted norms did not except that conduct from the category of misconduct under §8-1003). Misconduct must be connected with the work; the mere fact that misconduct adversely affects the employer's interests is not enough. *Fino v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd.*, 218 Md. 504 (1959). Although not sufficient in itself, a breach of duty to an employer is an essential element to make an act connected with the work. *Empl. Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202 (1958). Misconduct, however, need not occur during the hours of employment or the employer's premises. *Id.*

Without sufficient evidence of a willful and wanton disregard of an employee's obligations or gross indifference to the employer's interests, there can be no finding of gross misconduct. *Lehman v. Baker Protective Services, Inc.*, 221-BR-89. Where a showing of gross misconduct is based on a single action, the employer must show the employee demonstrated gross indifference to the employer's interests. *DLLR v. Muddiman*, 120 Md. App. 725, 737 (1998).

In determining whether an employee has committed gross misconduct, "[t]he important element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the employer's rights." *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Jones*, 79 Md. App. 531, 536 (1989). "It is also proper to note that what is 'deliberate and willful misconduct' will vary with each particular case. Here we 'are not looking simply for substandard conduct...but for a willful or wanton state of mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct.'" *Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates*, 218 Md. 202, 207 (1958)(internal citation omitted); also see *Hernandez v. DLLR*, 122 Md. App. 19, 25 (1998).

Aggravated misconduct is an amplification of gross misconduct where the claimant engages in "behavior committed with actual malice and deliberate disregard for the property, safety or life of others that...affects the employer, fellow employees, subcontractors, invitees of the employer, members of the public, or the ultimate consumer of the employer's products or services...and consists of either a physical assault or property loss so serious that the penalties of misconduct or gross misconduct are not sufficient."

In her appeal, the claimant reiterates her contention that she did not quit, but was discharged by the employer. The claimant asserts she is able to work in a sedentary position and that she is seeking employment. The claimant does not cite to the evidence of record and makes no other contentions of error.

On appeal, the Board reviews the evidence of record from the Lower Appeals hearing. The Board will not order the taking of additional evidence or a new hearing unless there has been clear error, a defect in the record, or a failure of due process. The record is complete. The claimant appeared and testified. The employer properly was given notice of the hearing, but did not appear. The necessary elements of due process were observed throughout the hearing. The Board finds no reason to order a new hearing or take additional evidence in this matter.

The Board has thoroughly reviewed the record from the hearing, but disagrees with the hearing examiner's conclusions and decision. The claimant did not intend to quit her employment and did not, in fact, quit her employment. The employer initiated the separation solely because the claimant could not continue to perform one of the necessary functions of her position. This inability was caused by a medical condition over which the claimant had no control. The Board concludes that the claimant was discharged for reasons which are not disqualifying.

The Board notes that the hearing examiner did not offer or admit the *Agency Fact Finding Report* into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the employer has not met its burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rose to the level of gross misconduct or misconduct within the meaning of §§8-1002 or 8-1003.

The decision of the hearing examiner is reversed.

DECISION

It is held that the claimant was discharged, but not for gross misconduct or misconduct connected with the work, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1002 or 1003. No disqualification is imposed based upon the claimant's separation from employment with PRINCE GEORGES CTY GOV EMPLOY.

The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.



Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson



Eileen M. Rehrmann, Associate Member

VD/mw

Copies mailed to:

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Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS DECISION

TONICHEA C WAYNES

SSN #

Claimant

vs.

PRINCE GEORGES CTY GOV EMPLY

Employer/Agency

Before the:

**Maryland Department of Labor,
Licensing and Regulation
Division of Appeals**
1100 North Eutaw Street
Room 511
Baltimore, MD 21201
(410) 767-2421

Appeal Number: 1304244
Appellant: Claimant
Local Office : 63 / CUMBERLAND
CLAIM CENTER

March 04, 2013

For the Claimant: PRESENT

For the Employer:

For the Agency:

ISSUE(S)

Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the MD. Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 1001 (Voluntary Quit for good cause), 1002 - 1002.1 (Gross/Aggravated Misconduct connected with the work), or 1003 (Misconduct connected with the work).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The claimant, Tonichea Waynes, began working for this employer, Prince Georges County Government on September 18, 2005. At the time of separation, the claimant was working as a correctional officer. The claimant last worked for the employer on January 3, 2013, before effectively quitting because she was found to be medically unfit for duty as a correctional officer. The claimant was injured in a non-work related accident. She suffered from herniated disc and was unable to spend prolonged periods of time, walking, standing or sitting.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits when unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily. The Court of Appeals interpreted Section 8-1001 in Allen v. CORE Target City Youth Program, 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975): "As we see it, the phrase 'leaving work voluntarily' has a plain, definite and sensible meaning...; it expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally, of his or her own free will, terminated the employment." 275 Md. at 79.

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001 provides that an individual shall be disqualified for benefits where unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or actions of the employer, or without valid circumstances. A circumstance is valid only if it is (i) a substantial cause that is directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with conditions of employment or actions of the employing unit; or (ii) of such necessitous or compelling nature that the individual has no reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001(c)(2) provides that an individual who leaves employment because of the health of the individual or another for whom the individual must care "shall submit a written statement or other documentary evidence of the health problem from a hospital or physician."

Where the claimant resigns due to a health problem resulting from an on-the-job injury, the reason for quitting is directly connected with the employment and constitutes good cause. Green v. Highland Health Facility, 438-BR-84. An illness that has no connection with the work may still be a valid circumstance if the illness is a necessitous or compelling reason to leave work, and there is no reasonable alternative to quitting. Pearson v. Coca Cola Bottling Company, 2040-BH-83.

EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE

The Hearing Examiner considered all of the testimony and evidence of record in reaching this decision. Where the evidence was in conflict, the Hearing Examiner decided the Facts on the credible evidence as determined by the Hearing Examiner.

The claimant had the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the reasons for the voluntary quit from the position with the employer of record constitute either good cause or valid circumstances pursuant to the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. Hargrove v. City of Baltimore, 2033-BH-83. In this case, this burden has been met.

The claimant effectively quit this employment because she was found not to be medically fit for duty. This is a voluntary quit because if the claimant had been able to work without restriction, continuing work would have been available. As the medical condition was not related to the employment, good cause cannot be found. To show valid circumstances, the claimant need to prove that her condition was both necessitous and compelling and that she had no reasonable alternative other than quitting. Both these requirements were met by the evidence that the employer found the claimant unfit for duty. She also provided medical documentation of her condition as required by the Statute cited above.

It is thus determined that the claimant has demonstrated that the reason for quitting rises to the level necessary to show valid circumstances within the meaning of the sections of law cited above.

DECISION

IT IS HELD THAT the claimant's unemployment was due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause, but with valid circumstances within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001. The claimant is disqualified for the week beginning December 30, 2012 and for the four weeks immediately following. The claimant will then be eligible for benefits so long as all other eligibility requirements are met. The claimant may contact Claimant Information Service concerning the other eligibility requirements of the law at ui@dllr.state.md.us or call 410-949-0022 from the Baltimore region, or 1-800-827-4839 from outside the Baltimore area. Deaf claimants with TTY may contact Client Information Service at 410-767-2727, or outside the Baltimore area at 1-800-827-4400.

The determination of the Claims Specialist is modified.

S Weber

S Weber, Esq.
Hearing Examiner

Notice of Right to Request Waiver of Overpayment

The Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation may seek recovery of any overpayment received by the Claimant. Pursuant to Section 8-809 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and Code of Maryland Regulations 09.32.07.01 through 09.32.07.09, the Claimant has a right to request a waiver of recovery of this overpayment. This request may be made by contacting Overpayment Recoveries Unit at 410-767-2404. If this request is made, the Claimant is entitled to a hearing on this issue.

A request for waiver of recovery of overpayment does not act as an appeal of this decision.

Esto es un documento legal importante que decide si usted recibirá los beneficios del seguro del desempleo. Si usted disiente de lo que fue decidido, usted tiene un tiempo limitado a apelar esta decisión. Si usted no entiende cómo apelar, usted puede contactar (301) 313-8000 para una explicación.

Notice of Right of Further Appeal

Any party may request a further appeal either in person, by facsimile or by mail with the Board of Appeals. Under COMAR 09.32.06.01A(1) appeals may not be filed by e-mail. Your appeal must be filed by March 19, 2013. You may file your request for further appeal in person at or by mail to the following address:

Board of Appeals
1100 North Eutaw Street
Room 515
Baltimore, Maryland 21201
Fax 410-767-2787
Phone 410-767-2781

NOTE: Appeals filed by mail are considered timely on the date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark.

Date of hearing : February 26,2013
CH/Specialist ID: RWD1D
Seq No: 002
Copies mailed on March 04, 2013 to:
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