-DECISION-

Claimant:

Decision No.:

5483-BR-11

KIN L BROWN

Date:

September 19, 2011

Appeal No.:

1107043

S.S. No.:

Employer:

MAYORS OFFICE CITY OF BALTO

L.O. No.:

65

Appellant:

Claimant

Whether the claimant left work voluntarily, without good cause within the meaning of Maryland Code, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1001.

- NOTICE OF RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT -

You may file an appeal from this decision in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City or one of the Circuit Courts in a county in Maryland. The court rules about how to file the appeal can be found in many public libraries, in the <u>Maryland Rules of Procedure</u>, Title 7, Chapter 200.

The period for filing an appeal expires: October 19, 2011

REVIEW ON THE RECORD

After a review on the record, the Board deletes "voluntary quit" from the second sentence of the first paragraph and substitutes "discharge". The Board also deletes "voluntary quit" from the first sentence of the second paragraph and substitutes "was discharged". The Board adds, as the final sentence of the second paragraph:

The claimant was discharged as a result of her insubordination when informed of a transfer and her failure to return to work. The transfer was effectuated because of the claimant's prior inability to get along with co-workers in spite of warnings.

The Board adopts the hearing examiner's modified findings of fact, but finds that these facts warrant different conclusions of law and a reversal of the hearing examiner's decision.

The General Assembly declared that, in its considered judgment, the public good and the general welfare of the citizens of the State required the enactment of the Unemployment Insurance Law, under the police powers of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of unemployment reserves to be used for the benefit of individuals unemployed through no fault of their own. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-102(c)*. Unemployment compensation laws are to be read liberally in favor of eligibility, and disqualification provisions are to be strictly construed. *Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Empl. & Training, 309 Md. 28 (1987)*.

The Board reviews the record *de novo* and may affirm, modify, or reverse the findings of fact or conclusions of law of the hearing examiner on the basis of evidence submitted to the hearing examiner, or evidence that the Board may direct to be taken, or may remand any case to a hearing examiner for purposes it may direct. *Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. Art., § 8-510(d)*; *COMAR 09.32.06.04(H)(1)*. The Board fully inquires into the facts of each particular case. *COMAR 09.32.06.02(E)*.

A threshold issue in this case is whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the claimant was discharged. For the following reasons, the Board affirms the hearing examiner's decision on this issue.

The burden of proof in this case is allocated according to whether the claimant voluntarily quit or whether the employer discharged the claimant. In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83*; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85*; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87*; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89*; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89*.

When a claimant voluntarily leaves work, he has the burden of proving that he left for good cause or valid circumstances based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. Hargrove v. City of Baltimore, 2033-BH-83; Chisholm v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 66-BR-89. Purely personal reasons, no matter how compelling, cannot constitute good cause as a matter of law. Bd. Of Educ. Of Montgomery County v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22 (1985). An objective standard is used to determine if the average employee would have left work in that situation; in addition, a determination is made as to whether a particular employee left in good faith, and an element of good faith is whether the claimant has exhausted all reasonable alternatives before leaving work. Board of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22 (1985); also see Bohrer v. Sheetz, Inc., Law No. 13361, (Cir. Ct. for Washington Co., Apr. 24, 1984). The "necessitous or compelling" requirement relating to a cause for leaving work voluntarily does not apply to "good cause". Board of Educ. v. Paynter, 303 Md. 22 (1985).

The intent to discharge or the intent to voluntarily quit can be manifested by words or actions. "Due to leaving work voluntarily" has a plain, definite and sensible meaning, free of ambiguity. It expresses a clear legislative intent that to disqualify a claimant from benefits, the evidence must establish that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally and of his or her own free will, terminated the

Simple misconduct within the meaning of § 8-1003 does not require intentional misbehavior. DLLR v. Hider, 349 Md. 71 (1998); also see Johns Hopkins University v. Board of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, 134 Md. App. 653, 662-63 (2000)(psychiatric condition which prevented claimant from conforming his/her conduct to accepted norms did not except that conduct from the category of misconduct under § 8-1003). Misconduct must be connected with the work; the mere fact that misconduct adversely affects the employer's interests is not enough. Fino v. Maryland Emp. Sec. Bd., 218 Md. 504 (1959). Although not sufficient in itself, a breach of duty to an employer is an essential element to make an act connected with the work. Empl. Sec. Bd. v. LeCates, 218 Md. 202 (1958). Misconduct, however, need not occur during the hours of employment or the employer's premises. Id.

Without sufficient evidence of a willful and wanton disregard of an employee's obligations or gross indifference to the employer's interests, there can be no finding of gross misconduct. *Lehman v. Baker Protective Services, Inc., 221-BR-89.* Where a showing of gross misconduct is based on a single action, the employer must show the employee demonstrated gross indifference to the employer's interests. *DLLR v. Muddiman, 120 Md. App. 725, 737 (1998).*

In determining whether an employee has committed gross misconduct, "[t]he important element to be considered is the nature of the misconduct and how seriously it affects the claimant's employment or the employer's rights." *Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Jones, 79 Md. App. 531, 536 (1989)*. "It is also proper to note that what is 'deliberate and willful misconduct' will vary with each particular case. Here we 'are not looking simply for substandard conduct...but for a willful or wanton state of mind accompanying the engaging in substandard conduct." *Employment Sec. Bd. v. LeCates, 218 Md. 202, 207 (1958)* (internal citation omitted); *also see Hernandez v. DLLR, 122 Md. App. 19, 25 (1998)*.

Aggravated misconduct is an amplification of gross misconduct where the claimant engages in "behavior committed with actual malice and deliberate disregard for the property, safety or life of others that...affects the employer, fellow employees, subcontractors, invitees of the employer, members of the public, or the ultimate consumer of the employer's products or services...and consists of either a physical assault or property loss so serious that the penalties of misconduct or gross misconduct are not sufficient."

The greater weight of the credible evidence of record shows that the claimant was discharged for walking out of a meeting. The meeting was being held to discuss a mandatory transfer. The claimant was being transferred because she had two warnings about her inability to get along with a co-worker, in violation of the employer's policies and expectations. The claimant did not return to work after this and was discharged for her actions.

The warnings were for conduct which the claimant could have controlled and problems which she could have avoided. The employer was not imposing unreasonable discipline and was not being arbitrary in its decision to transfer the claimant. The claimant's refusal, however, was unreasonable under the circumstances.

employment. Allen v. Core Target Youth Program, 275 Md. 69 (1975). A claimant's intent or state of mind is a factual issue for the Board of Appeals to resolve. Dept. of Econ. & Empl. Dev. v. Taylor, 108 Md. 250(1996), aff'd sub. nom., 344 Md. 687 (1997). An intent to quit one's job can be manifested by actions as well as words. Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company, 1101-BH-82. A resignation submitted in response to charges which might lead to discharge is a voluntary quit. Hickman v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 973-BR-88.

The intent to discharge can be manifested by actions as well as words. The issue is whether the reasonable person in the position of the claimant believed in good faith that he was discharged. See Dei Svaldi v. Martin Taubenfeld, D.D.S., P.A., 1074-BR-88 (the claimant was discharged after a telephone conversation during which she stated her anger at the employer and the employer stated to her, "If that's the way you feel, then you might as well not come in anymore." The claimant's reply of "Fine" does not make it a quit). Compare, Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company, 1101-BH-82. A quit in lieu of discharge is a discharge for unemployment insurance purposes. Tressler v. Anchor Motor Freight, 105-BR-83.

In her appeal, the claimant reiterates her contention that she did not quit her position. The Board agrees. The claimant's separation occurred by action of the employer; therefore it was a discharge. The remaining question is whether the discharge occurred for some disqualifying reason.

In a discharge case, the employer has the burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rise to the level of misconduct, gross misconduct or aggravated misconduct based upon a preponderance of the credible evidence in the record. *Hartman v. Polystyrene Products Co., Inc., 164-BH-83*; *Ward v. Maryland Permalite, Inc., 30-BR-85*; *Weimer v. Dept. of Transportation, 869-BH-87*; *Scruggs v. Division of Correction, 347-BH-89*; *Ivey v. Catterton Printing Co., 441-BH-89*.

As the Court of Appeals explained in *Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation v. Hider, 349 Md. 71, 82, 706 A.2d 1073 (1998)*, "in enacting the unemployment compensation program, the legislature created a graduated, three-tiered system of disqualifications from benefits based on employee misconduct. The severity of the disqualification increases in proportion to the seriousness of the misconduct."

Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation v. Boardley, 164 Md. 404, 408 fn.1 (2005).

Section 8-1002 of the Labor and Employment Article defines gross misconduct as conduct of an employee that is a deliberate and willful disregard of standards of behavior that an employing unit rightfully expects and that shows gross indifference to the interests of the employing unit or repeated violations of employment rules that prove a regular and wanton disregard of the employee's obligations.

The term "misconduct" as used in the statute means a transgression of some established rule or policy of the employer, the commission of a forbidden act, a dereliction from duty, or a course of wrongful conduct committed by an employee within the scope of his employment relationship, during hours of employment or on the employer's premises, within the meaning of Section 8-1003 of the Labor and Employment Article. (See, Rogers v. Radio Shack, 271 Md. 126, 314 A.2d 113).

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The Board is of the opinion that the claimant demonstrated clear and deliberate disregard for the employer's expectations and its interests. As such, her discharge was for gross misconduct under Maryland law.

The Board notes that the hearing examiner did not offer or admit the *Agency Fact Finding Report* into evidence. The Board did not consider this document when rendering its decision.

The Board finds based on a preponderance of the credible evidence that the employer met its burden of demonstrating that the claimant's actions rose to the level of gross misconduct within the meaning of δ 8-1002. The decision shall be reversed for the reasons stated herein.

DECISION

It is held that the claimant was discharged for gross misconduct connected with the work, within the meaning of Maryland Code Annotated, Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Section 1002. The claimant is disqualified from receiving benefits from the week beginning January 2, 2011, and until the claimant becomes re-employed, earns at least twenty times their weekly benefit amount and thereafter becomes unemployed through no fault of their own.

The Hearing Examiner's decision is reversed.

Donna Watts-Lamont, Chairperson

Clayton A. Mitchell, Sr., Associate Member

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RD/mw

Copies mailed to:

KIN L. BROWN
MAYORS OFFICE CITY OF BALTO
MAYORS OFFICE CITY OF BALTO
Susan Bass, Office of the Assistant Secretary

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEALS DECISION

KIN L BROWN

SSN#

Claimant

VS.

MAYORS OFFICE CITY OF BALTO

Employer/Agency

Before the:

Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation Division of Appeals 1100 North Eutaw Street Room 511 Baltimore, MD 21201

(410) 767-2421

Appeal Number: 1107043 Appellant: Employer

Local Office: 65 / SALISBURY

CLAIM CENTER

March 31, 2011

For the Claimant: PRESENT

For the Employer: PRESENT, THOMASINE FORTE, THERESA MELI, BAER CHANDLER

For the Agency:

ISSUE(S)

Whether the claimant's separation from this employment was for a disqualifying reason within the meaning of the MD Code Annotated Labor and Employment Article, Title 8, Sections 8-1001 (voluntary quit for good cause), 8-1002 - 1002.1 (gross/aggravated misconduct connected with the work) or 8-1003 (misconduct connected with the work).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The claimant Kin L. Brown, began working for this employer on June 8, 2002, and her last day worked was January 7, 2011. At the time of her voluntary quit, the claimant worked as a community aide, earning an hourly salary of \$10.00.

The claimant voluntarily quit this employment when she walked off the job in the middle of a meeting with her supervisors. As a result of two previous incidents in which the claimant was involved in altercations with her co-workers, the employer made the decision to transfer the claimant to another location that was less than five miles away. The employer notified the claimant at a meeting with her supervisors. The claimant refused the transfer and walked out of the meeting before it was adjourned. The claimant left the

premises before the end of her shift. The claimant failed to report to work the following day and failed to report to her new work location as instructed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001, states an individual shall be disqualified for benefits where unemployment is due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause arising from or connected with the conditions of employment or the actions of the employer, or without valid circumstances. A circumstance is valid only if it is (i) a substantial cause directly attributable to, arising from, or connected with conditions of employment or the actions of the employing unit; or (ii) of such necessitous or compelling nature the individual has no reasonable alternative other than leaving the employment.

EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE

The claimant had the burden to show, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that she voluntarily quit her position with this employer for reasons which constitute either good cause or valid circumstances, pursuant to the Maryland Unemployment Insurance Law. (<u>Hargrove v. City of Baltimore</u>, 2033-BH-83). In the case at bar, the claimant did not meet this burden.

In <u>Lawson v. Security Fence Supply Company</u>, 1101-BH-82, the Board of Appeals held "An intention to quit one's job can be manifested by actions as well as words;" while in <u>Smith v. P and J Contracting Company</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, 734-BH-89, the Board of Appeals held "The claimant voluntarily quit his job when he walked off the job site…"

Similarly, in the case at bar, the claimant evidenced her intent to quit when she refused the employer's instructions to transfer and walked off the job. The credible evidence shows the employer's decision to transfer the claimant was reasonable and did not impose an undue burden on the claimant. The claimant offered no credible reason for refusing the transfer. Therefore, the claimant has failed to show her reasons for quitting this employment constitute good cause or valid circumstances under the law.

Accordingly, the claimant failed to meet her burden in this case and the claimant's voluntary quit was neither for good cause nor due to a valid circumstance, and benefits are, therefore, denied.

DECISION

IT IS HELD THAT the claimant's unemployment was due to leaving work voluntarily without good cause or valid circumstances within the meaning of Md. Code Ann., Labor & Emp. Article, Section 8-1001. Benefits are denied for the week beginning January 2, 2011, and until the claimant becomes reemployed and earns at least 15 times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in covered wages and thereafter becomes unemployed through no fault of the claimant.

The determination of the Claims Specialist is reversed.

C A Applefeld, Esq. Hearing Examiner

Notice of Right to Request Waiver of Overpayment

The Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation may seek recovery of any overpayment received by the Claimant. Pursuant to Section 8-809 of the Labor and Employment Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland, and Code of Maryland Regulations 09.32.07.01 through 09.32.07.09, the Claimant has a right to request a waiver of recovery of this overpayment. This request may be made by contacting Overpayment Recoveries Unit at 410-767-2404. If this request is made, the Claimant is entitled to a hearing on this issue.

A request for waiver of recovery of overpayment does not act as an appeal of this decision.

Esto es un documento legal importante que decide si usted recibirá los beneficios del seguro del desempleo. Si usted disiente de lo que fue decidido, usted tiene un tiempo limitado a apelar esta decisión. Si usted no entiende cómo apelar, usted puede contactar (301) 313-8000 para una explicación.

Notice of Right of Further Appeal

Any party may request a further appeal <u>either</u> in person, by facsimile or by mail with the Board of Appeals. Under COMAR 09.32.06.01A(1) appeals may not be filed by e-mail. Your appeal must be filed by April 15, 2011. You may file your request for further appeal in person at or by mail to the following address:

Board of Appeals 1100 North Eutaw Street Room 515 Baltimore, Maryland 21201 Fax 410-767-2787 Phone 410-767-2781 **NOTE**: Appeals filed by mail are considered timely on the date of the U.S. Postal Service postmark.

Date of hearing : March 18,2011 CH/Specialist ID: USB32

Seq No: 001

Copies mailed on March 31, 2011 to:

KIN L. BROWN

MAYORS OFFICE CITY OF BALTO

LOCAL OFFICE #65

MAYORS OFFICE CITY OF BALTO